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The Continuing Role of Implied Covenants in
Developing Leased Lands
Keith B. Hall*

I. INTRODUCTION

The particular implied covenants that courts will recognize, the
duties included under these covenants, and the type of relief available
for breaches of the covenants have remained generally the same for
many years. However, public policy that favors an increase in domestic
production of oil and gas and changes in exploration, drilling, and
enhanced recovery technologies, creates the potential that parties and
courts will face new issues

(and

perhaps see new rules) in implied

covenant litigation, particularly as to the implied covenants relating to
the development and exploration of leased premises.
II. HISTORY AND NATURE OF IMPLIED COVENANTS IN OIL AND GAS
LEASES

A "covenant" has been defined as an agreement or promise
between two or more parties in writing, or, "[i]n its broadest usage ...

any agreement or contract."1

An implied covenant is one which may

reasonably "be inferred from the whole agreement and the conduct of
the parties."2 Jurisdictions within the United States almost universally
recognize the existence of implied covenants in contracts generally, with
the most commonly discussed covenant being the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. 3

*
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1. B LAC K'S LAW DICTIONARY 421 (9th ed. 2009).
2.
3.

Id at 419.
See

LA.

Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1983 (200 8);Yarbrough v. Devilbiss Air Power, Inc., 321 F.3d

728, 732 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying Arkansas law); Sparks v. Fidelity Nat'! Title Ins., 294 F.3d 259, 274
(1st Cir. 2002) (applying Massachusetts law); Shoney's, L.L.C. v. Mac East, L.L.C., No. 1071465, 2009

WL 2343674, at* 6 (Ala. July 31, 2009); Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 204 P.3d 1001, 1010 (Alaska 2009);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§

205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a
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Courts have found that this same implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing exists in oil and gas leases.4 But for more than 100 years,
courts also have held that other, more specific implied covenants exist in
such leases.5 It is generally agreed that implied covenants in oil and gas
leases originated in dicta from the 1889 Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision in

Stoddard

v.

Emery.6

One of the leading early cases

recognizing the existence of implied covenants in oil and gas leases is
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's 1905
opinion in Brewster

v.

Lanyon Zinc Co.1

The recognition of implied covenants in oil and gas leases is now
widespread, if not universal. Indeed, Michigan statutory law expressly
allows such covenants to exist in oil and gas leases, while generally
prohibiting such covenants in real estate conveyances.8

The specific

implied covenants that various jurisdictions recognize in oil and gas
leases sometimes differ from one state to the next. Some of the most
widely recognized implied covenants include duties of reasonable
development, diligence in marketing, and protection against drainage.

9

In addition, courts in some jurisdictions recognize an implied covenant
of further exploration, 10 and some have recognized an implied covenant
to restore the surface of the land to its original condition after the lease
is complete.11
Different jurisdictions use different terminology to describe the

duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.").
4. See, e.g., Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 908 (Colo. 2001).
5. See, e.g., McKnight v. Mfrs. Natural Gas Co., 23 A. 164, 166 (Pa.189 2) (finding an implied
covenant of reasonable development).
6. 18 A. 3 3 9 (Pa. 1889); s ee also 5 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE A. KRAMER, WILLIAMS &
MEYERS: OIL AND GAS LAW§ 802, at 3 ( 2009) (describing Stoddards dicta as the origin of implied
covenants).
7. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); see also JO H N s. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 307
(5th ed. 2009) (describing Brewster as a "leading case"); 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 802,
at 4 (describing Brewster as a "landmark" case).
8. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.5 (West 2006) ("No covenant shall be implied in any
conveyance of real estate, except oil and gas leases .... ).
9. Some have suggested that each of these actually is a specific application of a more general
covenant. See, e.g., Joseph Shade, The Oil & Gas Lease and ADR: A Marriage Made in Heaven
Waiting to Happen, 30 TULSA L.J. 599, 612-13 (1995) (noting that authorities have identified at least
six different implied covenants, but stating that: "Today, there is a trend toward applying only one
"

covenant-namely that the lessee will act as a reasonably prudent operator. This unitary analysis
utilizes one basic implied covenant with a number of different applications, depending on an infinite
variety of fact patterns."). But see LOWE, supra note 7, at 311-1 2 (noting that a reasonable prudent
operator standard is a common element of all implied covenants and acknowledging that some
commentators have suggested that the implied promise to act as a reasonably prudent operator is the
only covenant but stating that such "[a] unified analysis does not fit the case method by which the
courts have developed the various implied covenants").
10. See, e. g., Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984).
11. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that an implied duty to restore exists under
Arkansas law. Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444, 445-46 (Ark. 1986). In that
case, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that a majority of courts had held that no such duty exists,
but that there was a current trend toward finding such a duty, and the supreme court believed that
courts following that trend had the better view. Id The Arkansas Supreme Court reiterated the
existence of an implied duty to restore the surface in Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Murphy Exploration &
Production Co., 151 S.W.3d 306, 310-1 2 (Ark. 2004).
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implied covenants even when the covenants those states recognize are
similar or identical in substance to those recognized in other states. For
example, Texas recognizes implied duties to develop the premises,
protect the leasehold, and administer the lease.12

The duty to protect

against drainage is included in the duty to protect the leasehold,13 and a
duty to reasonably market oil and gas is part of the implied covenant to
administer the lease.14 Colorado recognizes four implied covenants: (1)
to c onduct exploratory drilling;

(2)

to develop the leased premises after

discovering resources that can be profitably developed;
diligently

and

market); and

prudently

(4)

(which

(3)

to operate

includes an implied covenant to

to protect the leased premises against drainage.15
A. Why Do Implied Covenants Exist?

Courts and commentators have expressed several explanations
regarding the functions served by implied covenants and the theoretical
source from which the covenants originate.

The two most common

explanations regarding function are that, implied covenants first,

fill

gaps in incomplete contracts and, second, promote fairness and equity.16
But at least one commentator has posited a third function-that implied
covenants serve public policy.17 As for the theoretical source of implied
covenants, a prom inent treatise states that implied covenants arise from
the general principle of cooperation that exists in the law of contracts.18
In Louisiana, however, the Supreme Court has stated that under its laws
the implied covenants found in oil and gas leases do not originate from
the general principle of cooperation found in the law of contracts,19 but
instead, are particularized expressions of Louisiana Civil Code article
2710's requirement that a lessee use the "thing leased as a good

administrator. "20

12.
13.

See Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2001).
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 14 n.42 (Tex. 2008).

14. See Yzaguirre, 53 S.W.3d at 373.
15. Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 659 (Colo. 1994); Whitham Farms, L.L.C. v. City of
Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 137 (Colo. App. 2003). cert. granted sub nom. Whitham Farms, L.L.C. v.
Encana Energy Res. Inc., No. 03SC652, 2004 WL 2029371 (Colo. Sept. 13, 2004). In addition, one of
.
Colorado's appellate court divisions has held that the covenant to conduct exploratory dnlhng

includes both exploration before discovering an initial reservoir and later exploration for additional
reservoirs in unproven areas. See Whitham Farms, 97 P.3d at 137 (citing Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co.,
694 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1984)).
16. See David E. Pierce, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant
to Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. lNST. 10-1, 10-9 (2002) (stating that "courts imply covenants in oil
and gas leases for two reasons: (1) to complete an incomplete contract; (2) to make the 'unfair'

contract 'fair,' or 'more fair"').
17. Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Oas Law Under Federal Energy
Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1489-90 (1981) (identifying contractual, eqmty, and pubhc

policy theories).
18.

19.

5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6,§ 802.1, at 8.
Louisiana does recognize, however, a general obligation of good faith in contracts. LA. Clv.

CODE ANN. art. 1983 (2008).
20.

Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 174 (La. 1992).
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1
CNG Transmission Corp ,2 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that, in an oil and gas lease in which the only compensation
In Jacobs

v.

.

to the lessor is to be royalty payments, there is an implied o bligation for
the lessee to make diligent efforts to produce oil or gas.22

The court

explained the reason for this implied covenant is that the lessor enters
the bargain expecting to be compensated for the lease, "and principles
of fairness dictate that the lessee be obligated to make diligent efforts to
3
ensure that the lessor receives the benefit of his bargain."2
A question closely related to why covenants exist is whether such
covenants are implied in law or in fact. A covenant is implied in fact if it
can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a contract, but the
covenant is not explicitly stated in words.24 A covenant is implied in law
if it is not inferred from the contract itself, but is imposed by the law to
prevent unjust enrichment or to otherwise ensure justice.25
The classification of a covenant as implied in law or implied in fact
can affect what statute of limitations will apply2 6 and whether a lessee
who has assigned the lease remains liable for satisfaction of the implied
8
covenant,27 as well as questions involving the parol evidence rule.2
Some commentators have suggested that the classification of implied
covenants as being implied in law or fact could affect venue29 and the
ease with which parties should be able to exclude the application of

implied covenants by the use of express provisions in a lease. 30

Several commentators state that covenants are implied in fact,
31 Most courts that

while others state that covenants are implied in law.

have explicitly addressed the issue hold that the covenants are implied
in fact. One of the most recent cases to expressly address this issue was
the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Smith
Co.32

v.

Amoco Production

In Smith, lessors brought a class action against their lessee,

alleging that the lessee had breached its implied covenant to diligently

21. 772 A.2d 44� (Pa. 2001).
22. Id al 455.
23. Id at 454. This could s upport either the implied-in-fact or implied-in-law theories-either
the parties contemplated that the lessee would make reasonable efforts (thus, the covenant is implied
in fact) or equity and fairness require the implied covenant (thus, the covenant is implied in law).
24. Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255. 265 (Kan. 2001).
25. Id at 267 .

26. See. C.fl. . id.; LOWE, supra note 7, at 30R; 5 MARTIN & KRAMER. supra note 6, § 803, at 18.3 .
27. LOWE. supra note 7. at 3�; 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6 , § 803, at 19.
28. See Smith. 31 P.3d at 267 (quoting commentary by Eugene Kuntz).
29. LOWE. supra note 7, at 308; 5 MARTIN & KRAMER. supra note 6, § 803, at 19.
30. LOWE. supra note 7, at 309; see 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 803, at 21.
31. 5 MARTIN & KRAMER. supra note 6, § R03. at 23 (stating that "we believe there is a large

element of truth on both sides"); Patrick H. Martin Implied Covenants in Oil and Oas Leases-Past.
Prc.fent and Future. 33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 640 ( l 994) ("While some have contended that implied
.

.

covcnanl� are 1mphed m fact. candor requires us to acknowledge that implied covenants are judicial
.
creations. JUSI as we are all now legal realists who will admit that courts often make law rather than
merely find it.").
32. 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2!Xll )
.
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market natural gas produced from its leases with the class members.33
The parties disputed whether the covenant to market diligently was a
covenant implied in law, which would result in a three-year statute of
limitations, or a covenant implied in fact, which would result in a five
year limitations period.

34

The Kansas Supreme Court surveyed a

number of cases, both from Kansas and other jurisdictions, as well as the
writings of several commentators.35

The court noted that courts from

Oklahoma,3 6 Texas,37 and Montana38 have held that such covenants are
implied in fact.

Several of the commentators whose publications were

discussed by the court similarly believed that covenants are implied in
fact.39 The Kansas Supreme Court determined that this was the better
view and held that under Kansas law the duty to reasonably market is
implied in fact.40

Few, if any, states have expressly held that implied

covenants are implied in law.

But, the Colorado Supreme Court has

reached decisions (particularly decisions regarding who may enforce
implied covenants) that seem inconsistent with a theory that implied
covenants are implied by the lease itself, yet are entirely consistent with
a theory that implied covenants are implied by the law.41
B.

Who Has the Right to Enforce Implied Covenants?

Some courts have addressed the issue of whether the lessee owes
implied covenant duties to persons other than lessors, such as overriding
royalty owners.42
33.
34.
35.
36 .

In Garman v. Conoco, Jnc.,43 the Colorado Supreme

Id at 257.
Id
Id at 265-68.
Id at 265 (citing Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 120 P.2d 349, 353-54

(Okla. 1941)). For a more recent Oklahoma case reaching a similar conclusion, see New Dominion,
L.L.C v. Parks Family Co., L.L.C, 216 P.3d 292, 297 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008) (holding that operator
did not owe duties to owner of forced pooling royalty interest under an implied covenant to market).
37. Smith, 31 P.3d at 265 (citing Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.
19 1)) .

4

The Texas Supreme Court continues to describe implied covenants in a way that suggests

they are implied in fact, not law. It states that implied covenants are not favored and should only be
found to exist when "legally necessary to effectuate the plain, clear. unmistakable intent of the
parties." In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tex. 2003) (recognizing the existence of an implied
covenant to reasonably develop leased premises). Fur ther, "(a) court cannot imply a covenant to
achieve what it believes to be a fair contract or to remedy an unwise or improvident contract. HECI
..

Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 888-89 (Tex. 1999) (recognizing implied covenant to protect
against drainage); see also Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Neinast, 67 S.W.3d 275, 282. 284 (Tex.
2002) (noting there cannot be an implied covenant if a lease expressly addresses the subject and
stating that"[n)o covenant can be implied in an oil and gas lease without 'first' examining the express
terms of the existing lease contract").

38. Smith. 31 P.3d at 266. Smith cited two Montana cases that do not use the phrase "implied in
fact," but which state that covenants are implied in order to give effect to the intent of the parties. Id

(citing Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., 806 P.2d 503, 507 (Mont.
602 P.2d 571, 578 (Mont. 1979)).
39.
40.
41.

42.

1991):

U.V. Indus .. Inc. v. Danielson,

Id at 268.
Id

See Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652.659 (Colo. 1994).

As part of the consideration for an oil and gas lease, the lessee typically agrees to pay the
lessor a "royalty," which will be a specified fraction of the value or proceeds of the oil and gas
produced pursuant to the lease. The lessee is entitled to ownership of the remainder of the oil or gas
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Court accepted a certified question from a

federal district court

regarding whether the owner of an overriding royalty is required t o
contribute a proportionate share o f post-production costs when the
assignment creating the overriding royalty is silent regarding allocation
of such costs. 44
The overriding royalty owners argued that the implied covenant t o
market requires the lessee to bear all post-production costs necessary t o

make the gas marketable. 45 Conoco disagreed, arguing that the implied
covenant to market does not require the lessee to bear post-production
costs incurred in making the product marketable and that the implied
covenant is not owed to overriding royalty owners.46 The Colorado
Supreme Court disagreed with both of Conoco's arguments.47

In

support of its conclusion that the implied covenant to market requires
the lessee to pay the cost of making gas marketable, the court made an
analogy to the implied obligation of the lessee to drill and noted that
drilling must be done at the lessee's expense. 48

The court then noted

that "[s]ome question exists whether the implied covenants under an oil
and gas lease extend to overriding royalty owners," but the court
concluded that fairness dictates that overriding royalty owners should
receive the same protection from the implied covenant as do lessors.49
The court noted that another reason lessors and royalty owners should
not bear a share of costs is that, unlike working interest owners, lessors
and overriding royalty owners do not have a voice in deciding what
expenditures will be made.5°

Finally, the court rejected Conoco's

argument that industry custom dictated a different result.51 The court
stated that industry custom should not be binding on a person unless she
knows of it or should know of it, and lessors and even overriding royalty
owners reasonably might not have knowledge of industry custom.52
Based on these principles, the court concluded that in the absence of a
contractual

provision

stating

how

post-production

costs

will

be

allocated, neither lessors nor overriding royalty owners should bear any

that is produced. But as part of a separate agreement, the lessee may agree to pay a n "overriding
royalty" to some third person. The overriding royalty, which typically will be a specified fraction of
the value or proceeds of any oil and gas that is produced, might be paid to a geologist who helped
determine the most promising place to drill or some other person involved in the prospecting process.

Or, an assignee of the rights of the lessee might agree to pay an overriding royalty to the original
lessee who made the assignment. Thus, the overriding royalty owner is not the lessor and typically is
not a party to the oil and gas lease.
43. 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
44. Id at 653.
45.

4 6.
47.

Id at 656.

Id.

48.

See id at 660-61.
Id at 659.

SO.
51.

Id at 660.
Id

4 9.

52.

Id at 659 n.23.

Id
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portion of the post-production costs necessary to make a product
marketable.53
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed this issue in XAE Corp.
v. SMR Property Management Co.54 In XAE, the lessee granted "[a]n
overriding royalty interest of an undivided 1/8 of 7/8 of all gas . . .
produced under . . . the leases described . . . to be delivered to the
Assignees ... free and clear of all costs and expenses whatsoever, save
and except . . . taxes ... chargeable thereto." 55 The parties disputed
whether the costs which were free to the owner of the overriding royalty
were limited to production costs, so that the overriding royalty owner
would have to bear a proportionate share of the post-production costs
associated with gathering, transporting, and treating the gas. 56

The

resolution of this question turned in part on whether the owner of the
overriding royalty

could enforce the lessee's implied covenant to

market. The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that the owner of
an overriding royalty cannot enforce the implied covenant to market
unless the lessee has expressly agreed to assume such liabilities in the
act assigning the overriding royalty (which the lessee in XAE had not
done).57 The Oklahoma Supreme Court's conclusion in XAE, thus,

contrasts with the Colorado Supreme Court's conclusion in Garman.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the lessee's implied
covenant duties do not extend to overriding royalty owners and the
Colorado Supreme Court decided otherwise.
Ill. JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Implied Covenant to Test
Early in the oil and gas industry, courts concluded that a lessee has
an implied duty to promptly begin drilling a test well or wells, generally
within the first year of the lease.58 But often, it was not practical for a
lessee to begin drilling that quickly. In order to avoid an implied duty to
drill a test well within a particular period, lessees began to draft leases
with delay rental clauses.59 Such clauses provided that the lessee could
defer or delay any duty to begin drilling within the first year by paying a
specified amount in delay rentals.6<J Generally, the delay-rental clause

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id at 660-61.
968 P.2d 1201 (Okla. 1998).
Id at 1202.
Id
Id at 1207.

Oil and Gas Law,
Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of

33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 683 (1994).
59. Id at 684.
60 . Id
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would allow the lessee to defer its obligation to drill test wells in
subsequent years too, by paying delay rentals for each year that the
lessee did not drill. Now, it is so common for oil and gas leases to
explicitly address the lessee's duty to drill test wells-by providing that
the lessee can delay such an obligation by paying delay r entals (or by
providing that the lease is a paid-up lease)61-that the implied duty to
test is seldom of significance.62
B.

Implied Covenant ofReasonable Development

Once oil or gas has been found in paying quantities, a lessee has a
duty to reasonably develop the property. This duty has been recognized
for over 100 years.63 Whether the lessee has breached this duty is a fact
issue.64 Courts will consider a variety of factors in determining whether
a lessee has breached this duty, including: (1) geological data; (2) the
number and location of wells drilled on or near the leased premises; (3)
productive capacity of existing wells; (4) cost of drilling compared with
the profits reasonably expected; (5) time interval between completion of
the last well and demand for additional performance; and (6) acreage
involved in the lease being considered. 65
If a breach of the covenant is established, the lessor generally will
be entitled to some sort of relief, typically an award of damages, lease
cancellation in whole or part, or conditional cancellation.66 If damages
are awarded for such a breach, the measure of damages generally will be
"the full value of royalty lost" by the lessor.67 Awarding damages can
involve considerations of whether the oil was simply produced later than
it should have been, in which case the loss will involve interest, and the
difference in prices between the time the oil was produced and the time
it should have been produced.68
C

Implied Covenant to Protect Against Drainage

A producing well drains oil or gas from the surrounding area, and
when a producing well is located close enough to a property boundary,
61. In a paid-up lease, a lessee typically makes an up-front payment that serves as both the
"bonus" that lessees typically pay lessors upon grant of a lease as well as compensation for the
privilege of delaying the duty to drill test wells.
62. See id. at 684.
63. See, e.g., McKnight v. Mfrs.' Natural Gas Co., 23 A. 164, 166 (Pa. 1892).
64. See, e.g., Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Miller, 112 So. 2d 695, 699 (La. 1959); see also LOWE,
supra note 7 , at 316; cl 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 833.3, at 240-41 (discussing evidentiary
issues related to whether a duty has been breached).
65. Eg., Edmundson Bros. v. Montex Drilling Co., 731 So. 2d 1049, 1055 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
66. LOWE, supra note 7, at 322; 5 MARTIN & K RAME R, supra note 6, § 834, at 245-46, 249
(noting when a "conditional cancellation" is granted, the court orders that the lease will be cancelled
if the lessee does not remedy the breach within a specified period of time).
67. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. 2008).
68.

Id.
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the well will drain oil or gas from beneath the neighboring property.
Since at least 1896, courts have recognized that a lessee has a duty to
protect the leased premises from drainage by wells located on
neighboring properties. 69 To establish a breach of the implied covenant
to protect against drainage, a lessor must prove that substantial drainage
from the lessee's field occurred and that a reasonably prudent operator
would have acted to prevent the drainage.70 The primary means of
protecting against drainage historically has been the drilling of offset
wells, but the lessee does not have a duty to drill offset wells unless
doing so would be profitable. 71 Further, the drilling of offset wells is not
the only way to protect against drainage. Another way is through
pooling or unitization.72
Some courts suggest that a lessee should be held to a higher
standard than the reasonably prudent operator standard when the it is
the lessee of the land being drained, as well as the operator of the well
that is doing the draining.73 But other courts have rejected arguments
for a higher standard in such situations.7 4
Courts have reached different conclusions about the measure of
damages for a breach of the duty to protect against drainage. In Coastal
Oil & Gas Corp. v. GaJZa Energy Trust,15 the Texas Supreme Court
clarified that, under Texas law, the correct measure of damages for a
breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage is the value
of the royalty lost to the lessor because of the lessee's failure to act as a
reasonably prudent operator.76
Although Garza rejected other
measures of damages on grounds that they sometimes will
overcompensate the lessor, the court noted that, depending on whether
the offset exceeded the drainage, the correct measure of damages for a
breach of the duty to protect against drainage are the royalty that would
have been received on the production from an offset well or that would
have been paid on the amount of oil or gas drained from the lessor's

69. See Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 109 (Pa. 1896); see also Bradford Oil Co. v. Blair, 4 A.
218, 220 (Pa. 1886). In Texas, the duty to protect against drainage exists, but courts refer to the duty
to protect against drainage as being part of a general duty to protect the leasehold. Garza, 268
S.W.3d at 14 n.42 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 6 2 2 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 1981)).
70. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 17-18 n.57 (citing Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton. 133 S.W.3d 245, 253
(Tex. 2004)).
71. See id at 17.
72. Se. Pipe Line Co. v. Tichauhek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. 1999) (stating that pooling can be
used to satisfy the duty to protect against drainage); sec Breaux v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 163 So.
2d 406, 4 1 5 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (noting that lessee possibly could satisfy the duty to protect against
drainage by seeking compulsory unitization), application denied, 165 So. 2d 481 (La. 1964); cl Garza,
268 S.W.3d at 17-18 n.57 (referring to the possibility of a lessee protecting against drainage by
seeking voluntary unitization or field-wide regulatory action).
73. Sec Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978, 984 (10th Cir. 1977).
74. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 19 n.63.
75. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
76. Id at 18-19.
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property.77 Other authorities have also noted these two ways to
measure damages for a breach of this duty.78

D. Implied Covenant ofFurther Exploration
As noted above, there is an implied covenant to develop
reasonably known productive formations once oil or gas is discovered in
paying quantities.
But after production in paying quantities is
established, is there also a duty to explore further non-productive areas
where the existence of an oil or gas formation has not been
established- a so-called implied covenant of further exploration? Some
commentators suggest that there is, or at least should be, a duty to
explore non-productive areas,79 while other commentators argue
otherwise.80 Texas rejects the existence of any such duty that is separate
from the duty of reasonable development,81 as does Oklahoma.8 2
The Louisiana Mineral Code does not state whether such a duty
exists. The redactors' official comment to mineral code article 122
states that there is such an implied duty,83 and the comments have
persuasive authority.84 But comments to code articles are not law, as
the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions and as
the court has demonstrated by sometimes rejecting statements made in
the comments.85 Indeed, the comment to article 122 also states that
there is an implied duty to restore the surface, and the Louisiana
Supreme Court has repudiated that statement.86 Thus, one must look to
court decisions to determine whether a duty of further exploration exists
under Louisiana law.
Although a prominent treatise states that "Louisiana courts are
probably the most severe in the country in enforcing an implied duty to
explore further,"87 relatively few Louisiana cases discuss an implied
covenant or obligation or duty of "further exploration" in those terms.
Those who assert that such an implied obligation exists under Louisiana
77.
78.
79.

Id
See, e.g., 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 825.2, at 161 to 168.3.

See Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Further Exploration: A Comment, 37 T EX L. REV.
179 (1958); C. J. Meyers, The Implied Covenant ofFurther Exploration , 34 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1956).
80. See Earl A. Brown, The Proposed New Covenant of Further Exploration: Reply to
Comment,
TEx. L. REV. 303 ( 1959).
The leading case is Gifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959). Other Texas cases
have followed Gifton. See, e.g., Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson,
S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex.
1990).
82. Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 449 (Okla. 1981).
83. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 3 1: 122 cmt. (2000).
84. See, e.g., Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co.,
So. 2d 1257, 1262 (La. 1999) (citing LA. REV. STA T.
ANN.§ 3 1: 122 cmt.).
85. See, e.g., Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 797 (La. 2005)
(stating that comments to the Mineral Code are not law); Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So. 2d
8 1 1, 813 (La. 1991) (same).
86. Terrebonne, 893 So. 2d at 797.
5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6,§ 845.4, at 341.

81.

.

37

783

737

87 .
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law point to a line of cases that begins with the Louisiana Supreme
Court's decision in Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.88 In that case,
a fault divided the leased premises. 89 The lessee had drilled two paying
gas wells on the 493 acres that were on one side of the fault, but the
lessee had not drilled any wells on the 824 acres located on the other
side of the fault.90 The lessee introduced testimony of two geologists
who thought it was unlikely that gas would be found on the side of the
fault where the lessee had not drilled.91 The lessee then argued that he
had reasonably developed the property and any wells drilled on the
undeveloped side of the fault would be wildcat, exploratory wells.92
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's order
granting partial cancellation of the lease, and some of the language in
the case supports the view that the case was effectively imposing on the
lessee a duty of further exploration, subsequent to the finding of gas in
paying quantities.93 The language most often noted in Carter is
language quoted from an Oklahoma case, Fox Petroleum Co. v.
Booker,94 which stated that "it is an implied condition that the lessee
will test every part" of the leased premises.95 Carter also relied in part
on Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.,96 but a close reading of
Carter shows some potential ambiguity. Although the defendant
offered testimony of "two reputable and well qualified geologists" who
opined there likely was not gas in paying quantities on the undeveloped
side of the fault, Carternoted:
All the testimony introduced both by plaintiffs and by defendant is to the
effect that, according to the history of all such faults in proven oil and gas
fields, production has been had on both the up-throw and down-throw
side thereof, with possibly one exception named by defendant's geologist.
Plaintiffs' expert testified that he knew of no instance where
production was not obtained from both sides of such fault in a proven
97
field.

Further, the plaintiff called an experienced operator who was familiar
88. 36 So. 2d 26 (La. 1948).
Id at 27.

89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id
Id at 28.
Id at 27.
Id at 29.

253 P.33 (Okla. 1926).
Fox contains some language that would be supportive of the existence of an
implied covenant of further exploration, but this does not mean that such a duty exists under
Oklahoma law. The issue in Fox was whether the lessee had abandoned a portion of the leased
premises, not whether the Jessee had an implied duty of further exploration. Id at 34. F urther, the
court held that the lessor had not carried its burden of proving that the lessee had abandoned any
portion of the leased premises. Id at 39. Moreover, Fox and its progeny have not been the basis for
a large number of lease cancellations based on abandonment. Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has held that Oklahoma law does not recognize an implied covenant of further exploration. See
Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 63 P.2d 441, 449 (Okla. 1981) ("We thus hold there is no implied
8
covenant to further explore after paying production is obtained .... )
96. 29 2 U.S. 272 (1934).
97. Carter, 36 So. 2d at 26 28.
Id at 38.

"

,
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with the area and had seismic work done in the area. 9 8

That operator

testified that he would be willing to drill a well on the property if he
owned the lease.9 9 This language suggests that the court may have
reached its holding based on a conclusion that the lessee had not
reasonably developed a known field, rather than on the conclusion that
there existed a further duty to explore.
Another case from this line of jurisprudence is Wier

v.

Grubb.100

In Wier, the plaintiff was a lessee-sublessor who sought cancellation of
the sublease from the defendants.101 The defendants had drilled three
producing wells, one of which quit producing after a year, then drilled a
fourth well that was a dry hole.102 The plaintiff made a written demand
for further

development, but the defendants performed no more

drilling, and the plaintiff brought suit for partial termination of the
sublease.103
The evidence showed the four wells drilled by the
defendants were all on the far eastern end of the property in a relatively
small area compared to the 335 acres that were subject to
sublease.104
The

defendant

argued

they

had

reasonably

developed

the
the

subleased premises and that geological information showed it was highly
improbable that oil or gas would be found on the undeveloped portion
of the subleased tract.105

The court nevertheless granted partial

termination, and some language in the opinion seemed to support the
existence of a duty of further exploration (though not using that
But, it is noteworthy that the sublease had language,

phrase).106

italicized by the court, that adopted the terms of the lease, and the lease
contained terms, also italicized by the court, which provided that if the
lessee discovered oil or gas in paying quantities, it would diligently
develop the lease premises and "release such portions of the leased area
as Lessee may be unwilling to develop."107 Thus, the court's partial
termination of the sublease appears to have been based in large part, if
not entirely, on enforcement of the lease's express obligations, rather
than on an implied duty to further explore.
Co.

Other cases in this line of jurisprudence include Sohio Petroleum
09
and Noel v.
v. Miller, 10 8 Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 1

98.

9 9.
100.

IOI.

102.
103 .
10 4.

105.

106.
107.

108.

Id. at 29.
Id.

82So. 2d I
Id at 2.
Id at 4.
Id
Id at

(La. 19 55).

5.

Id at 3.
Id at 5.
Id at 4.

112 So.

2d

69 5(La. 1 9 5 9 ).

In Miller, the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered a partial lease

cancellation and cited Carter in support of its order. Miller involved a lease that expressly obligated
the lessee to develop reasonably the leased premises, and the court may have relied in whole or in

The Continuing Role ofImplied Covenants

2010]

Amoco Production Co.11°

325

On the whole, these cases may effectively

establish an implied duty of further exploration in Louisiana, but the
establishment of such a duty is not as clear as some have suggested.111
In other jurisdictions, such as Arkansas, the courts have described
the

duty

of

further

development

broadly

enough

that

some

commentators have suggested Arkansas tacitly recognizes a duty of
12
further exploration, 1 though the state's courts do not appear to have
applied by name a duty of "further exploration."

In Gillette v. Pepper

Tank Co., 113 a Colorado appellate court held that an implied duty of
further exploration exists under Colorado law.114 However, neither the
Colorado Supreme Court nor any other Colorado appellate court has
reached this issue.

In Kansas, the Deep Horizons Act 1 15 has been

described as imposing a statutory requirement for further exploration. 116
This statute deserves mention when discussing the p ossible existence in
leases of an implied duty of further exploration,

but the statute's

provisions for further explanation are express, not implied, and, of
course, are imposed by the statute, not by a lease.
E.

What IfIt Would Be Uneconomical to De velop Further?

The implied covenant of reasonable development does not require
a lessee to engage in development that is likely to be unprofitable.117
Thus, the lessee is not required to develop further the leased premises if
doing so would b e unprofitable. But, if it would not be profitable to
develop further the leased premises and the lessee refuses to release the
undeveloped areas, is the lessee holding those areas improperly for
speculative purposes-something which would be disfavored in many
part on that express provision of the lease, as opposed to an implied covenant. Id. at 699.
109. 961F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1992). In Duhon, the court cited Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Company, 36 So. 2d 26 (La. 1948) and referred in dicta to a possible duty of further exploration. Id.
at 1211.

110. 826 F. Supp. 1000 (W.D. La. 1993). Noel cites caner and specifically refers to carter as
having established a duty of further exploration. Id. at 1005. But Noel, a federal district court case, is
not a reliable basis for predicting how the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide the issue of
whether there exists an implied duty of further exploration.
111. The lack of clarity in the Louisiana jurisprudence is recognized by a prominent

commentator from Louisiana, Professor Patrick H. Martin, who has stated that Louisiana "perhaps
tacitly" recognizes an implied covenant of further exploration. Martin, supra note 31, at 650-51.
112. Id. (describing Arkansas as perhaps recognizing such a duty). Courts state that, under
Arkansas law, there exists in any oil and gas lease in which a payment of royalties constitutes the
chief consideration, an implied covenant that the lessee will explore the property with reasonable
diligence, so as to produce oil and gas in paying quantities throughout the entire tract. Davis v. Ross
Prod. Co., 910 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Ark. 1995).
113.
114.

694 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1984).
Id at 372.

115. KAN.STAT. ANN§§ 55-223 to 55-229 (2008).
116. Conine, supra note 58, at 688 n.73; see also JOHNS. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON OIL AND GAS LAW 506 (5th ed. 2008).

117. See Rush v. King Oil Co., 556 P.2d 431, 435 (Kan. 1976); Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v.
Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989); Sonat Exploration Co. v. Superior Oil Co 710 P.2d 221.
228-29 (Wyo. 1985).
.•
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jurisdictions?

In Whitham Farms L.L. C v. City of Longmont, 1 1 8 the

plaintiff argued that the implied covenant to develop requires a lessee to
release land that has not been developed if it would not be economically
prudent to develop. 1 1 9 The parties presented the case to the trial court
based on stipulated facts and briefs. 1 20 The case involved three oil and
gas leases that covered a total of 310 acres.121

The three leases

contained provisions giving the lessees the right to enter into pooling
agreements, which the lessees subsequently exercised to develop the
three tracts as a single unit. 122 The only well on the property was drilled
in 1982 and was recompleted as a producing well in 1997. 123
One of the surface and mineral owners demanded in 1 999 that the
lessees release the lease, except for the area associated with the one
producing well.124 Another of the surface and mineral owners made the
same demand in 200 1 .125

The lessees refused to release any of the

leases, and the two surface and mineral owners who demanded releases
brought suit, requesting a judgment terminating the lease.126
Both sides agreed that it would not be economically prudent for the
operator to develop further the oil and gas reserves from the leased
premises. 1 27

Yet, they disagreed about the implication of that fact.128

The lessor argued that the lessee's failure to release t h e undeveloped
portions of the lease, despite the lessee's contention that it would not be
economically

prudent

to

develop

further

the

leased

premises,

demonstrated that the lessee was holding those areas for speculative
1
purposes. 2 9
The court disagreed, holding that, under the pooling agreement,
production from a single well was sufficient to maintain the entire
pooled area.13° Further, prior Colorado cases had held that a single well
may be sufficient to satisfy implied covenants as to the entire unitized
areas.131

Moreover, the lessor had not presented evidence that the

resources could not be profitably developed within a reasonable time.132
Thus, the lessee prevailed, and the lease was not cancelled.

But

significantly, the court stated that legal authority exists for terminating
1 1 8. 97 P.3d 1 35 (Colo. App. 2003), cert. granted sub nom. Whitham Farms, L.L.C.
Energy Res. Inc., No. 03SC652, 2CXW WL 2029371 (Colo. Sept. 1 3 , 2004).
1 1 9.

Id. at 1 37.

1 20.

Id.

1 2 1 . Id. at 1 36.
1 22 . See id. at 139.
1 23.
1 24.

See id. at l36.
Id.

1 25 .

Id.

1 26. Id.
1 2 7.
1 2X.
1 29.

See id. at 137.
Id.
Id.

1 30.
131 .

Id. a t 1 39.
Id.

1 32 .

Id

v.

Encana
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leases on the grounds that they are being held for speculative purposes
if: ( I ) the lessee is not developing an area; (2) it appears that it is not
economically prudent to develop the area; and (3) the lessee is holding
on to its lease rights in the area for the "mere speculative and remote
hope that the economics might change and non-viable mineral holdings

might become profitable at some unspecified time in the future. "1 33

Although it does not seem that courts have aggressively used this to
cancel leases, the language of the case does suggest that if a lessee has
not promptly developed an area and the lessor brings suit for an alleged
failure to reasonably develop, the lessee should be careful regarding
arguments that further development would be uneconomical.
IV. A VOIDING COVENANTS BY DRAITING THE LEASE TO DEFINE THE

LESSEE'S DUTIES
Numerous cases demonstrate that an implied covenant will not
apply

so as

to

contradict directly the

express

terms

of a

lease.

Moreover, an implied covenant likely will not impose a particular type
of duty if the lease's express provisions impose the same type of duty,
even if a duty under an implied covenant would not directly contradict
the express terms of the lease.

Thus, a lessee can avoid or limit its

obligations under an implied covenant by negotiating for the lease to
govern expressly and preclude the existence of an implied duty.
One of the recent cases i llustrating this principle is Lundin/Weber

Co. L.L. C v. Brea Oil Co., 1 34 a 2004 California appellate court decision.

In Lundin/Weber, the defendant was the lessee under two leases -one
granted in 1 926 and the other in 1995 - covering certain land in Kern
County, California.135

The plaintiff was the landowner and lessor. '36

The lessee drilled several oil and gas wells on the leased property and

was paying royalties to the lessor. 1 37 The lessor brought suit, asserting
California

that

should

recognize

an

implied

covenant

of

further

exploration and that the lessee had breached this covenant by failing to
drill more wells at a depth greater than 3 ,000 feet and by not drilling a
well deeper than 5,000 feet . 1 3 8
The lessee argued that California had never recognized an implied

covenant of further exploration and should not do so now. 1 3 9 The lessee
also argued that even if an implied obligation of further exploration did

1 33.

Id at 1 3R (quoting N.Y. Land Ass'n

1 34.
135 .
136.
1 37.
138.
1 39.

11 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 768 (0. App. 2004).
Id at 769.
Id
Id
Id at 769-70.
Sec id. at 770.

v.

Byron Oil Indus., 695 P.2d 1 1118 (Colo. App. 1 9114)).
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exist under California law, such a duty should not apply in this case.140
The lessee argued that when a lease expressly defines the scope of a
particular type of duty, the lease does not contain an implied covenant
for the same sort of duty (for example, if a lease stated how many
exploratory wells the lessee must drill, there would be no implied duty
to drill exploratory wells). Here, the lease expressly defined the lessee's
drilling and exploration obligations by explicitly stating the number of
wells that would satisfy its drilling and exploration obligations. 1 41
Therefore, argued the lessee, the court should not find the existence of
an implied covenant of further exploration in the two leases at issue in
this case, even if the court otherwise would have been prepared to hold
California

that

law

recognizes

that do
4
exploration obligations.1 2

exploration
The

in

leases

court briefly

discussed

an
not
the

implied
expressly

of

further

the

lessee's

covenant
define

implied covenant of further

exploration concept, citing a couple of respected treatises and law
review articles, without concluding whether this covenant generally will
exist in oil and gas leases under California law. 1 43 The court then
examined whether the terms of the two particular leases would preclude

the existence of an implied covenant to explore further. 1 44

The court

noted that, in the absence of a contrary provision in the lease, California
law does recognize in each oil and gas lease an implied covenant that the
lessee will
production

use

reasonable diligence

of oil.1 45

Further,

in

California

the

exploration

law will

for

and

allow implied

covenants to coexist with express covenants if the express covenants do
not address all phases of a lessee's obligations as to exploration,
6
However, the
development, and protection of the leased premises. 1 4
court state d that implied coven ants cannot conflict
covenants.1 47

with express

In this case, the 1 926 lease stated that the lessee would drill ten new
wells in each of the first four years of the lease, and that the lessee
would drill those wells to a depth of 1 ,000 feet, unless oil was discovered
in paying quantities at a lesser depth.1 48 The lessor in this case was not
complaining about drainage, but the 1926 lease also happened to define
the lessee's duty regarding offset wells.1 49 Relying in part on a 1921
California case, the court in Lundin/Weber determined that the lease's
1 40.
I 41 .
1 42.
1 43.
1 44 .
1 45 .
1 46.
1 47.
1 48.
1 49.

See id
Id at 772-75 .
See id at 769.
Id at 771 (citing Martin, supra note
Id at 772-75 .
Id. at 77 .
1
Id
Id
Id at 772-73.
Id.

3 1 ).
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lessee's drilling obligations were

sufficient to cover all of the lessee's drilling obligations; thus, there was
no room for the existence of an implied covenant o f further exploration
in the 1926 lease.150
The 1 995 lease stated that, subject to the lessee's right to defer
drilling obligations by paying annual delay rentals, the lessee would
commence drilling operations during the primary term "and thereafter
. . . prosecute the drilling of a well or wells with reasonable diligence
until oil or gas . . . is found in quantities deemed paying by [l]essee."151
The lease further provided that "[ a]fter the discovery of oil, gas or other
leased substances in paying quantities . . . [l]essee shall reasonably
develop the acreage retained . . . but . . . shall in no event be required to
drill more than one well per ten (10) acres" of retained area capable of
producing oil in paying quantities or 160 acres of retained area capable
of producing gas in paying quantities.152

The lease also discussed the

lessee's obligations, subsequent to the primary term, to execute partial
releases of the lease.153
The court determined that the express terms of the lease created an
obligation to drill exploratory wells until oil or gas was found in paying
quantities. 154 After that time, the lease created an obligation to develop
reasonably the
reasonable

acreage it retained, defined what would constitute

development,

and

addressed

retention and release of acreage.155
no

room

for

the

existence

of

the parties'

rights

as to

Given these provisions, there was
an

implied

covenant

of

further

exploration.156 Because the court determined the express terms of the
two leases precluded the existence of implied covenants of further
exploration, the court chose not to express an opinion regarding
whether California law recognizes an implied covenant of further
exploration when the terms of a specific lease do not preclude such a
covenant.157
Another

case

illustrating

that

express

lease

provisions

can

supersede implied covenants on the same subj ect is Schroeder v. Terra
Energy, Ltd, 1 5 8 a 1997 appellate court case from Michigan.

Schroeder

involved litigation over whether the lessee could deduct post-production
treatment and transport costs from the sale price of natural gas sold at a
market miles from a well, when the parties' agreements provided that

150.
151 .
152.

Id at 773-74.
Id at 744.
Id
Id at 774-75.
Id at 775.
Id at 774.
Id at 775.
Id.

153.
154.
155.
1 56 .
157.
1 58. 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
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royalties would be computed as a fraction of "gross proceeds at the
wellhead" and also referred to paying royalties based on "the prevailing
market rate at the wellhead."159 The court noted the issue was one of
first impression in Michigan. 1 60 The plaintiff lessors argued that
Michigan law imposes on lessees an implied covenant to market oil and
gas, and this covenant obligates lessees to bear the costs of making gas
saleable.161 The lessors also argued that the lessees breached the
implied covenant by not obtaining the "best available market price" for
gas. 162
The court disagreed and concluded that it need not decide whether
an implied covenant to market exists under Michigan law.163 The court
reasoned that even if such a covenant exists, it would not override
express contractual provisions stating how the royalty was to be
calculated.164 The court interpreted "gross proceeds at the wellhead'' as
allowing a deduction for post-production costs of treatment and
transport and interpreted the contract's reference to payment of
royalties based on the "prevailing market rate" as negating plaintiff's
argument that the lessee was obligated to obtain the best possible
market price.165 In holding that the lessee could deduct costs of
treatment and transportation, the court reasoned that the result was
consistent with economic theory. 1 66 Because there was no market at the
wellhead, the value at the wellhead should be calculated based on taking
the value at the market where the gas was sold and deducting the
costs - treatment and transport- that made the gas saleable at that
location. 1 67 The court noted that other state courts have reached this
conclusion, as have commentators. 168 Further, although no Michigan
court had decided the issue in the context of a royalty dispute, Michigan
used this work-back method to calculate the value of gas at the wellhead
for purposes of severance tax calculations. 1 69 Schroeder, thus, stands for
the proposition that if an oil and gas lease provides that a portion of the
post-production costs incurred to make gas marketable are to be
allocated to the lessor, an implied covenant to market does not
supersede such provisions in a lease so as to require a lessee to bear the
entirety of such post-production costs.

1 59.

Id. at 1\90.

1 60.

Id at X IJ ! .

161.

Id

1 62 .

Id

1 63.

Id at XIJ5.

1 64.

Id at 896.

1 65.

See id

1 66.

Id at 895.

1 67.

Id

1 68.

Id

1 69.

Id
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Similarly, in Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Jnc.,1 70 the Texas
Supreme Court stated that the lessors' argument regarding the scope of
the implied covenant to market was inconsistent with the express terms
of the lease and that an implied covenant to market could not o verride
express terms of an oil and gas lease.1 71 In an earlier case, the Texas
Supreme Court explained: "We have imposed implied covenants only
when they are fundamental to the purpose of a mineral lease and when
the lease does not expressly address the subject matter of the covenant
sought to be implied. "1 72 Numerous other courts have reached similar
results.1 73
V.

LESSEES' STANDARD OF CONDUCT

Throughout the United States, the standard to which lessee
operators are held is that of a reasonably prudent and capable operator,
who takes into consideration both his own interests and those of the
lessor.1 74 Even states with rules generally favorable to lessors have not
imposed fiduciary duties1 75 or strict liability on lessees. 176 For example,
Arkansas, unlike most states, recognizes an implied covenant to restore
the surface.1 77 Further, Arkansas jurisprudence does not require, as a
prerequisite to a lease termination order, that a lessor make pre-suit
demand and give the lessee a chance to perform. 17 8 And Arkansas is
one of the states that has a statutory Pugh clause.179 Yet, Arkansas
1 70.
1 71.
1 72.
1 73.

53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001).
Id at 373.
HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 889 (Tex. 1998).

See, e.g., Williamson v. Elf Aquitane, Inc., 138 F.3d 546, 552 (5th Cir. 1998) {holding that in
take or pay litigation, under Mississippi law, an implied covenant would not exist when the lease had

9

an express provision that covered the topic); Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 75 ,
Pa.
(stating that implied covenant to develop the leased premises "appropriately
exists where the compensation to the landowners is derived solely from royalty payments," but if the

784 (W.D.

2004)

lease provides for "adequate" compensation to the lessor if the lessee elects not to drill during the
term of the lease, then there is not an obligation to develop and produce) ; Meisler v. Gull Oil, Inc.,
848 N.E.2d 1 1 12, 1 1 16 (Ind. a. App. 2006) {"Initially we note that the implied covenant of

reasonable development applies only when there is no express provision in the lease governing such
matters."); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d I , 19 n.64 (Tex. 2008) (sta ti ng
when an oil and gas lease provides for royalties and "fail[s] to define the lessee's duty as regards
development after discovery of paying oil or gas, the law implie[s] the obligation from the lessee to
contin ue the development and production of oil and gas with reasonable diligence") (quoting W.T.
Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 19 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex. 1929)); Croston v. Emax Oil Co., 464

728,

733 (W. Va. 1995) ("This duty to protect against drainage is predicated upon the notion
that, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary in a lease, there is an implied covenant in
the lease that the lessee will protect the lessor's property against substantial drainage.").
174. E.g., LA. REV. ST A T . ANN. § 3 1 : 1 22 (2000) ; see Davis v. Ross Prod. Co.. 910 S.W.2d 209, 2 1 3

S.E.2d

{Ark. 1 995).

175.

Eg., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3 1 : 1 22 (providing that a l�ssee does no � owe a fiduciary duty to
a lessor); Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.3d 1 225, 1 229 (7th Cir. 1996) ( noting that a lessee 1s not a
fiduciary of a lessor under Illinois law).
1 76. The standard of conduct instead is one of reasonably prudent operation. Eg., LA. REV.

ST AT. ANN. § 3 1 : 1 22 .
See, e.g., Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Br ien Oil & Gas Co 7 1 5 S.W.2d 444. 446 ( Ark. 1 986).
See, e.g., Da vis, 910 S.W.2d at 2 1 2,
1 79. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 1 5-73-201 ( 1 994).

1 77.
178 .

2 1 4.
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recognizes that a lessee is entitled to some deference in deciding how

many wells to drill and acknowledges that a lessee 's j udgments and
actions need not be perfect.180

For example, in Sunbelt Exploration Co. v. Stephens Production
o. 1 1
C , 8 the lessors and a top lessee j oined in a suit seekin g cancellatio n of

the original leases on the basis o f alleged failures to develop reasonably
and protect against drainage.182

In Sunbelt, the original lessees held

leases in the Gregory Unit and in three adjoining units south of the
Gregory Unit.183 These four units shared multiple reservoirs. 1 84 The
lessees drilled the Gregory No.

1

Well on the Gregory U nit in 1959, but

did not complete it at the so-called Dunn Reservoir level. 1 85 In 196 1 , the

lessees completed a well at the Dunn Reservoir level in one of the three

southern u nits, and from

to 1 985, they drilled offse t wells into the
Dunn Reservoir on the other two southern units. 1 86

1961

In coming back to the Gregory Unit, the lessee finally recompleted

its Gregory No.

1

Well into the D unn reservoir in 1971 .1 87

In 1 990, it

was confirmed that a fault ran through the Gregory Unit, from east to

west, thereby preventing the Gregory No. 1 Well from draining the
portion of the Dunn Reservoir that lay south of the fault.188 The lessee

then promptly drilled additional wells on the Gregory U nit south of the

fault.189

In seeking cancellation of the original lease, the lessor and top

lessee argued that the original lessee breached implied covenants in
three ways:

(1)

by failing to recomplete the Gregory No.

Dunn Reservoir prior to
and

(3)

1971; (2)

1

Well into the

by not discovering the fault earlier;

by not protecting the Gregory Unit from drainage.190

The

plaintiffs also cited j urisprudence from other states for the proposition
that, because one of the lessees owned the draining well, the original
lessees had the burden of proving that their conduct was reasonable.191

The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments.

First, the court noted that, under Arkansas law, the party alleging a
breach of the implied covenant has the burden of proof. 1 92

As to the

180. See Da vis, 910 S.W.2d at 213 ("While due deference should be given to the judgment of the
lessee as operator to determine how many wells should be drilled, the lessee must use sound

judgment, and promote and protect the interests of both himself and the lessor.").
181. 896 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. 1995).
182. Id at 870.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
1 90.
191.
1 92.

Id at 869.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id at 869-70.
Id at 869.
Id at 8 7 1 .
Id
Id at 872.
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claim that the lessee unreasonably failed to recomplete the Gregory No.

1

Well into the D unn Reservoir earlier than

1 971,

the court noted that

uncontroverted evidence showed that when the Gregory No.

1

Well was

drilled in 1959, technology was not available to dete rmine whether the

Dunn Reservoir had significant amounts of gas. 193

Furthermore, when

the lessee finally r ecompleted the well into the Dunn Reservoir in

1971,

the only reason the lessee was able to produce significant quantities of
gas from that reservoir was by use of what the court called

"extraordinary measures," such as sandfracing.194

Consequently, even

though the reservoir did contain significant gas, it was not unreasonable

to have waited unt i l

1 971 to recomplete

into that reservoir. 195

As for the lessee 's failure to discover the fault until 1990, the court

noted that the top lessee's own geologist testified that he missed the

fault when he reviewed data in 1 98 1 . 1 96

One of the original lessee's

geologists testified that he saw evidence of what might be a fault but

concluded incorrectly that the data merely showed a thinning of the
reservoir. 1 97 Another geologist, who had done some mapping for the

original lessee in the late 1 980s, testified that he previously concluded

that there probably was a fault but could not tell i n what direction the

fault ran.198 He also made recommendations for the drilling of a well,
which the original lessee eventually drilled, confirming the existence of

the fault.199

B ased on this evidence, the court concluded that the

original lessee had not breached its duty to act as a reasonably prudent

operator by failing to discove r the fault earlier.200

Finally, the court concluded that the lessee did not breach its duty

by failing to drill

offset wells.201

Under Arkansas Oil and Gas

Commission rules, an operator normally would not be allowed to drill

more than one well from the same unit into the same reservoir unless

there was a fault dividing the two wells.202 Thus, the court's conclusion

that the original lessee had not been unreasonable in failing to find the

fault earlier conceivably could have been enough for the court t o reject

the drainage claim, but the court also noted that the testimony of

geologists did not support

a

contention that there had been significant

drainage.203 Accordingly, the court also rejected the claim for failure to

193.

Id at 871.

194.

Id at 871.

195.

Id at 872.

196.

Id

197.

Id

198.

Id

199.
200.

Id
Id at 873.

201.

Id

202.

Id at 872.

203.

Id
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4
protect against drainage.20

VI. PREREQUISITES TO THE REMEDY OF LEASE CANCELLATION
If a lessee breaches its duty under a n implied covenant, the lessor
might be entitled to an award of monetary damages or to cancellation of
the lease, depending upon the j urisdiction as well as the type of duty
that was breached and other circumstances. But cancellation of a lease
205
is a harsh remedy.
Accordingly, some j urisdictions have developed a
preference for awards of damages, rather than lease cancellation, and
most jurisdictions that allow lease cancellation as a remedy require that
the lessor must first give the lessee notice of the breach and a reasonable
opportunity to
cancellation.206

cure the breach before the lessor may seek lease

This principle was illustrated in Lewis v. Kansas
07
Production Co., 2 when the Kansas appellate court was called upon to
resolve an issue of first impression under the Kansas Deep Horizons

In Lewis, the lessee breached its implied covenant to explore
09
and develop the leased premises.2
The lessor sued for termination of
10
the lease.2
Although the lessor sent a pre-suit letter to the lessee

Act.208

alleging breach, the letter did not suggest that the lessor would accept
efforts to develop the leased premises, a n d the district court determined
the letter did not constitute a demand for the lessee to comply with its
obligations to develop the property.2 1 1 The district court granted a
1
termination without giving the lessee a chance to cure the breach.2 2

204. See id at 872-73.
205. See McDowell v.

PG&E Res. Co.,

658

779, 784 (La. Ct. App. 1 995) (noting that
661 So. 2d 1382 (La. 1995); cf. St. Luke's
663 S.E.2d 639, 644 (W. Va. 2008) (noting courts
So. 2d

cancellation of a lease is a harsh remedy), writ demed,

United Methodist Church v. CNG Dev. Co.,
developed a preference fo r monetary damages as a remedy, rather than termination of leases, "based
upon the significant investment intrinsic to oil and gas exploration and development").
206.

See, e.g., Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 226

F.3d 560, 569 ( 6th

Cir. 2001) (holding

that, under Kentucky law, a lessor must give the lessee notice of an alleged breach of the implied
covenant of reasonable development and demand performance within a reasonable time before the
lessor can be entitled to termination of the lease for breach of the implied covenant); Northrup

Props., Inc. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., No. 07-30-ART, 2008 WL 818995, at *6 (E.D. Ky.
Mar. 25, 2008); McDo well, 658 So. 2d at 783 (holding that lessor must give Jessee notice and a

reasonable opportunity to perform before seeking cancellation of a lease for alleged breach of
implied duty); Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd., 553 N.W.2d 784, 789 (N.D. 1996). An oil and gas lease may
be terminated for a breach of the implied covenant to market the product, see Pack v . Santa Fe
Minerals, 869 P.2d 323, 330 (Okla. 1994), though, the lessor must first demand that the lessee comply
with the implied covenant and give the lessee a reasonable time to do so. See James Energy Co. v.

847 P.2d 333, 338 (Okla. 1993); Crain v. Hill Res., Inc., 972 P.2d 1 179, 1 181
(Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (awarding lease cancellation); see also Danne v. Texaco Exploration & Prod.,
Inc., 883 P.2d 210, 2 1 8 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994) (affirming cancellation of lease for breach of implied
HCG Energy Corp.,

covenant to market).

Some jurisdictions also make pre-suit demand a prerequisite to a suit for

damages for the breach of an implied covenant. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
207. 199 P.3d 180 (Kan. a. App. 2009).

208.
209.
210.
21 1.
212.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § § 55-223 to 55-229 (2008).
lewis, 199 P.3d at 1 83.
Id. at 182.
See id
Id

31:136 (2000).
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The lessee appealed, arguing that i t should be given a reasonable time to
develop t h e property.213

The appeal turned on the meaning of section

55-226

of the Kansas

Deep Horizons Act, which provides that all oil and gas leases include an

implied

covenant

to explore

and

develop reasonably

the

leased

premises. 2 1 4 The act provides that when a lessee has breached this
implied covenant, the court may give the lessee a reasonable time to
compl y, or t h e court may enter an order terminating the lease.215
However, t h e last section of the act states that the act "shall not alter or

affect substantive rights or remedies under any such mineral leases
" 6
under the common law. 2 1 After reviewing past Kansas j urisprudence,

the court d e t e rmined that the rule under the common law i n Kansas was

that if the l essor had not made a demand that the lessee develop the

leased premises, a court had to give the lessee a reasonable time to

develop t h e premises unless demand for development would be futile or

the lessee h a d abandoned the lease.217

If the lessee failed to develop

reasonably the premises within t h e time given, the court could then

grant termination.2 1 8 The court determined that this rule still applied.219
Thus,

section

interpre ting

55-226
55-226 as

and

section

55-229

could be

reconciled by

allowing a court to grant termination without

giving the l essee time to cure its breach if, but only if, the lessor made a

demand for development, or demand would be futile, or the lessee had
abandoned the lease .220

In this case, the lessee had n o t abandoned the lease.221

because t h e

lessee had expresse d

a desire to develop

premises, demand would not be futile.222

Further,

the leased

The trial court implied that

demand w ould be futile because the lessee had not taken steps to

develop t h e l eased premises during the course of litigation.223

But the

appellate court held that under Kansas law the lessee's duty to perform

was suspen d e d while its title to the lease was under attack.224
Kansas ,

Like

other

j urisdictions

requiring

notice

and

an

opportunity t o c ure have held that notice terminating the lease, because

of an alleged breach, is insufficient without offering the lessee a chance
to cure.225 Indeed, if a lessor wrongfully repudiates a lessee's title to the
213.

Id.

214.

See id. at 1 83 .
2 1 5 . KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-226 (2008).
216. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-229 (2008).
2 1 7 . Lewis, 1 99 P.3d a t 185-86.
2 18.

Id. at 186.

219.

Id. at 1 87

220.

See id.

22 1 .

Id.

222.

Id.

223.

id.

224.

Id.

225.

Rid!

v.

EP Operating Ltd 553 N.W. 2d
..

784, 788

( N . D . 1 996).
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lease, the lessee's duty to perform is suspe nded.226
Arkansas law is an exception to the general rule that a lessor must
make pre-suit demand on the lessee a n d give the lessee a reasonable
opportunity to cure a breach before the lessor can be entitled t o lease
cancellation. If t h e lessor has not previo usly given the lessee notice and
an opportunity t o cure, the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that a
conditional cancellation, giving the lessee an opportunity t o cure the
breach, is preferred.227

Yet, though a conditional cancellation may be

preferred, an unconditional cancellation may sometimes be granted.
For example, in Da vis v. Ross Production Co.,228 the Arkansas Supreme
Court affirmed a n unconditional cancellation of a portion of a l e ase in a
case in which there apparently was no pre-suit demand to perform .2 29 In
0
Da vis, a lessor granted an oil and gas lease covering 120 acres in 1 9 7 9.23
The 120-acre tract was divided into three 40-acre drilling units, a n d wells
were drilled on each of the three units. B ut only one of those wells was
productive, and n o wells were drilled after 1984.231

In late 1992, t he

lessor granted a top lease that covered one of the 40-acre units t h a t did
not have a productive well.232 In early 1994, the original lessee wrote a
letter to the top lessee, stating that the original leases were sti l l v a l id and
that the top lessee, therefore, must release his top leases.233 In response,
the top lessee demanded that the original lessee release his lease rights
to the extent the rights related to the particular 40-acre unit that was the
subject of the top lease.234 The top lessee 's letter to the original lessee
was not quoted in the court's opinion, but the letter apparently did not
demand that the original lessee perform its obligations.235 Fur t her, the
lessor never demanded that the original lessee perform.236
Both the top lessee and the original lessee filed applications with
Arkansas's Conse rvation Commission for a permit to drill a well on the
disputed unit.237

Both applicants proposed a location that would be as

close as possible, under the applicable spacing orders, to the prod uctive
well on the neighboring unit. mi Thus, by its actions, the original lessee
ind icated a willingness to perform.
The original lessee filed a petition to q uiet the title to its lease-hold
rights, and the top lessee counterclaimed asking for an order cancelling
226. ( '1111lllnl Oil & C i nll. Corp. v. C iar1.1 Encrity Trust, 2hll S.W.Jd I . 20 (Tex. 2!XlM).
227. Sec Rolic rllon Enlers. v. Miller 1.nnd & Lum her Co 71Ml S. W.2d 57, 5ll ( Ark. I YX.'i ) .
22X. 'l lO S.W.2d 209 ( A r k . l 'N:'i).
22Y. Iii. n l 2 1 1 .
.•

2.'to.
2.\7.

fcl. R I 2 1 Cl.
/cl.
Id 111 .'! 1 11- 1 1 .
/c/. n 1 2 1 1
M
Sec iJ.
.'ice 1J.
Ill

2.'X.

Id.

2.lfl.
2J I .
2.l2.
2.U.

2-'-I.
2., :'i.

.
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The court

found that the approximately eleven-to-twelve year period without any
activity o n the unit at issue constituted a breach of the implied covenant
to explore the land.240 The supreme court granted partial cancellation
of the lease, specifically cancelling the original lessee ' s lease as to the 40
acres in dispute.241

In doing so, the supreme court reversed the lower

court's holding that there had been no breach of the implied covenant
and that cancellation was improper.242

Further, the supreme court

unconditionally granted cancellation of the disputed portion of the lease
in spite o f the absence of any pre-suit demand for performance by either
the lessor or the top lessee who requested cancellation.243
A. Questions ofLa w and Fact
Oil and gas leases are contracts, and the general rules relating to
contracts and contract interpretation apply.
supply

the

language of the

Because lessees often

lease, and because

lessees often are

presumed to have more bargaining power, courts sometimes state that
any ambiguities should be construed in favor of the lessor, or stated
another way, against the draftsma n.244
exists is a matter of law.245

Whether an implied covenant

Whether an implied covenant has been

breached is a question of fact.246
B. Burden ofProof
Commentators and courts note that lessors have difficulty carrying
their

burden

239.

Id

240.

/d a t 2 1 3 .

242.

Id
Id

2 4 1 . Id.
243.

2 4.
4

of

proof

in

breach

of

implied

covenant

cases.247

at 2 1 4.

Sec. c./!. Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp.. 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 773 (W.D. Pa. 21X14).
.

Interpretation of contracts gene ral l y is an issue of law. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Cor p. v.
Texas Utils. Elec. Co . lJlJ5 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tex. 1 999). Furt hermore, l i ti gants sometimes di spute not
just t h e m e a n i ng of a particular contract, but whether a particular state's laws recognize a parti cular
245.

.

type of im p l i e d covenant at all. See. e.g.. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So.
2d 789. XOI ( La. 2005) (holding Louisiana does not recogni7.e an impl i ed duty to restore the surface);
Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 44 1 , 449 (Okla. 1981 ) (stating O k l a homa does not
recognize an i mplied covenant of further exploration.).
246. Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.3d 1 225, 1 22 8 (7th Cir. l lJlJ6) (noting that whether lessee

breached duty to prolect against drai na ge was a question of facl); W h i th am Farms, L. L.C. v. City of

Lo ngm on t . 97 P.3d 1 35. 1 39 ( Colo App 2(Xl3); Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd., 553 N.W.2d 784, 788 (N.D.
I 996): Sonat Exploration Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 7 1 O P.2d 22 1 , 226 (Wyo. 1 985); see Carter v. Ark.
.

.

La. G as Co., 36 So. 2d 26. 2X (La. I 94X ).

247. Coa stal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d I. 1 6 (Tex. 21XlX) ( referring to
the difficulty of proving t he amount of oil or gas lost to drainage) ; see. e.g. , Jacqueline Lang Weaver.
When [;A.press Cfauscs Bar Implied Covenants. Especially in Niuural GHs Marketing Scenurios. 37

NAT. RESOURCES J . 49 1 . 491 n.2 ( 1 997) (spe cu l a l i ng that the invention of 3-D seismic technology
might make i t easier for lessors to prove that lessees have failed to drill profitable wells. and thereby
mighl "rcinvigora t ( c ) the implied coven an t to develop").
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Accordingly, one can argue for the burden of proof to be placed on
lessees to prove that their actions have been reasonable.

So far, that

generally has not happened.248 The lessor has the burden of proof to
show breach of an implied covenant.249
Courts generally will give some deference to lessees in their
decisions about development.250 And, b ecause lessees presumably are
driven by a profit motive, a lessee does not breach the implied covenant
to develop unless he fails to drill wells that likely would be profitable.
One commentator has argued that a

lessee's decisions regarding

development "should be entitled to enj oy a powerful presumption of
compliance

with

commentators

his

have

implied

concluded,

covenant
"it

is

duties."251

But

impractical to rely

other
on

the

self-interest of the lessee alone" given the divergence of interest that
results from "the fact that the lessee has the risk- and cost-bearing
working interest under the lease, while the lessor retains a cost-free
royalty interest. "252 Despite the general rule that the lessor alleging a
breach of an implied covenant has the burden of proving each element
of his claim, some courts have allowed the burden to shift to the lessee
in certain situations.253
VII. DOES THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF REASONABLE DEVELOPMENT
OR PRUDENT OPERATIONS REQUIRE THE LESSEE TO ENGAGE IN
WELL STIMULATION OR SECONDARY RECOVERY?

Although at least one commentator has argued that the implied
covenant of reasonable production already leads to overproduction,254 a
more prevalent

view is that public policy should favor increased

248. There are some exceptions. One statutory exception is the Kansas Deep Horizons Act. See
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-223 (2lXl9) (providing that, as a matter of public policy, an implied covenant of
reasonable development and exploration exists); see id. § 55-224 (providing for circumstances i n
which there will be a rebuttable presumption that lessee h a s breached the implied covenant
established by § 55-223); see id. § 55-225 (providing that lessee has the burden of proof in rebutting
the existence of a presumed breach).
249. Whitham Farms, 97 P.Jd at 1 38-39; Sonat Exploration, 7 1 0 P.2d at 228-29.
250. E.g., Davis v. Ross Prod. Co., 9IO S.W.2d 209, 2 1 3 (Ark. 1 995).
25 1 . Stephen F. Williams, Implied Covenants' Threa t to the Value of Oil and Gas Reserves, 36
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 3- 1 , 3-7 ( 1 985).
252. Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.Jd 1225, 1 230 (7th Cir. 1 996) (noting conflict of interest
between lessor and lessee arising from fact that lessor does not share in the costs and, the refore, the
risk of drilling); Conine, supra note 58, at 676.
253. At least one court shifted the burden to the lessee in a case in which the lessor a lleged a
breach of the duty to protect against drainage. The lessor h a d made an initial showing that drainage
existed, and the defendant-lessee also was the operator of the well on neighboring property that
allegedly was draining the plai ntiff-lessor's land. E.g. E l l iott v. Pure Oil Co., 1 39 N.E.2d 295 (111.
1956). In addition, Professor Lowe states that when a lessor a l leges a breach of the implied covenant
of reasonable development: "In Oklahoma and perhaps a few other states . . . the burden of proof
.
shifts
to the lessee when an unreasonable period of time has elapsed after the initial discovery."
Lowe, supra note 7, at 3 1 6- 1 7.
254. See Patrick H. Martin, A Modem Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, De velop, and
Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 INST. ON OIL. & GAS L. & T AX N 1 77, 205-06 (1 976).
.

'

The Continuing Role ofImplied Covenants

2010]

production,

including increased

production from

339

fields.255

existing

Further, the lessor will benefit from increased production by way of
more royalties.

Thus, both public policy and the interests of lessors

might dictate that lessees be required to use advanced t echnology to
increase

production.

And

operators

have

been

using

various

technologies to increase production since nearly the beginning of the oil
and gas industry.
One

type of technology used to increase production is well

stimulation - which includes

various

methods,

such

as

fracturing.

Operators have been engaged in fracturing, beginnin g with explosive
fracturing, since the 1860s to create cracks in underground rocks in
order to increase production.25 6 Fracturing is common now, but it is
likely to be even more important in the future.
becoming

increasingly important

in

natural

gas

Shale plays are
production,

and

"fracing" often is the only method to extract profitably natural gas from
shale form ations.2 57
Other

types

of technology,

such as secondary

recovery and

enhanced recovery techniques, attempt to produce more oil and gas
than is possible using only primary recovery. "Primary recovery" refers
to the production of oil and gas using the pressure contained in the
undergrou n d formation where the oil and gas is found.

However,

primary recovery can leave up to 70% of the petroleum in the
reservoir. 2 5 8 Secondary recovery involves supplementing the pressure of
the underground reservoir by injecting gas or water, both of which
typically are found naturally in underground formations, to boost the
underground pressure.

Operators have also engaged in secondary

recovery for many years and also now commonly engage in enhanced
recovery, which involves the underground injection of s ubstances not
normally found in underground formations.259
Over the years, secondary recovery, enhanced recovery, and well-

255. See, e.g., Pennzoil v. Fed. Energy Regul atory Comm., 645 F.2d 360, 380 n.39 (5th Cir. 1981)
(discussing federal incentives for production from stripper wells).
256. See NORMAN J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION,
DRILLING, AND PRODUCTION 422 (2d ed. 2001); see also Roberts v. Dickey, 20 F. Cas. 880, 883-84
(W.D. Pa. 1871) (discussing patent granted in 1866 for use in explosive fra ctur ing) Hydraulic
fracturing was developed in 1948, and operators sometimes use acidizing for the same purpose. See
HYNE, supra at 422-23. Fracturing is particularly useful in recovering gas from low permeability or
.

"tight" formations. Eg., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 , 6-7 (Tex.

2008) (discussing the hydraulic "fracing" process).
257. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Water.s:
Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation,

258.

1 991).
259.

See

The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas

20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 123 (2009).

JAMES G. SPEIGHT, THE CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF PETROLEUM 1 46 (2d ed.

See HYNE, supra note 256, at 523. The first method of secondary recovery of oil probably
involved the reinjection of natural gas into reservoirs, which was first performed prior to 1900.
SPEIGHT, supra note 258, at 149. Enhanced recovery is the production of more oil from an otherwise
depleted reservoir by injection of fluids not found naturally in a producing reservoir. HYNE, supra
note 256, at 477.
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stimulation technology has advanced.260 Nevertheless, surprisingly few
recent cases discuss whether a lessee has an implied duty to engage in
well stimulation, secondary recovery, or enhanced recovery as part of
the

lessee's

obligations

under

the

implied

covenant

to

develop
1
In

reasonably or as part of his implied covenant of prudent operation. 26

one Louisiana case, a court awarded cancellation of a lease because the
court found that a lessee's failure to fireflood amounted to a failure to
2
develop reasonably the leased premises. 26
For the most part, other cases merely have stated that such a duty
might exist or their statements that such a duty exists have appeared
only in dicta.

The Kansas Supreme Court referred to the possible

existence of such a duty in Cra wford v. Hrabe,263 in which the court held
that a lessee had the right, without its lessor's permission, to use and
inject salt water from other properties into a producing formation on the
lessee's premises for purposes of a secondary-recovery project.264

The

court, however, did not go so far as to opine that such a duty exists.
Several older decisions from Illinois - usually in the context of
stating that a lessor has the right to engage in secondary recovery- state
in dicta that a duty to engage in secondary recovery exists.265

In

addition, an older case from Oklahoma notes that some commentators
have stated such a duty might exist.266
VIII. RUMINATI ONS ON THE STABILITY OF IMPLIED COVENANT LAW
Changes to the law of implied covenants, or changes brought about
by parties drafting leases that expressly define the scope of duties that
otherwise would be imposed by implied covenants, could come from
three sources - government, lessors, or lessees.

Public policy might be

260. Sec 11lm PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS: MANUAL OF
011. AND GAS TERMS 1 033 ( 1 2th ed. 2003) (stating in reference to "secondary recovery" that:
··Broadly defined, this term incl udes all methods of oil extraction i n which energy sources extrinsic to
the reservoir arc utilized i n th e extraction").
26 1 .

The M1mU11/ of Oil and Gas Tr:rms does not define "well stimulation," but i t notes that

"stimulate" is defined by a West Virginia statute as "any action taken by well operator to increase the
inherent product ivity of an oil or gas well including, but not limited to, fracturing, shooting or

acidizing, but excluding clean i n g out. bailing or workover operations." Id. at 1 092.
262.

Wa seco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State O i l Corp., 371 So. 2d 305. 3 1 3 (La. Ct. App.

1979), wrir dewed. 374 So. 2d 656

(L1.

1 979).

In an older Louisiana decision, a court held that a

lessee breached its duty lo develop reasonably the premises by failing to use aci di zing technology - a
type of well stimulation. See Wadkins v . Wilson Oil Corp. . 6 So. 2 d 720 (La. 1942).
263. 44 P.3d 442 (Kan. 2002).
264. Id. at 453.
265. £.�.. Reed v. Tex. Co .. 1 59 N.E.2d 64 1 . 644 ( I l l . App. Ct. 1 959) (noting older I l l i nois cases
stating that "it was an implied right, and e ve n a duty. for a reasonably prudent operator to adopt a

rcpressurmg system for the secondary recovery of oil"); Bi-County P ro ps. v. Wampler, 378 N.E.2d
3 1 U15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 978).
2fl6 In ll' Shailer's Estate, 2M P.2d 613, 6 1 6 · 1 7 (Okla. 1 954) (noting that "[t]here is respectable
:
authority to the effect that there is an implied covenant in oil and gas leases that a lessee sh ou l d

secondary recovery m ethod shown t o be practical a n d presumably profitable as a means o f
getting additional return from the lease").
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well served by changes to the law of implied covenants.267
courts not done more to alter the implied covenants?

Why have

One reason

probably i s that the common law is conservative, in the sense of being
stable and generally slow to change or innovate. And this disinclination
toward rapid innovation and change arguably is particularly j ustified
when dealing with implied obligations in contracts, given that parties
can, if they choose, explicitly address the nature and scope of their
various contractual obligations.

Indeed, as to mineral leases that

already have been executed, any significant expansion

of implied

covenants could impose on lessees duties that the parties did not bargain
for or even contemplate at the time they entered the lease.
This concern was expressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court when
it ruled that Louisiana law does not recognize an implied covenant to
restore t h e surface in Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex
68
I n that case, the lessor was the school board of a parish

Energy, Inc.2

on the Louisiana Gulf Coast.269

The school board sued several former

lessees for restoration of the surface in certain coastal areas.270

The

school board prevailed in the lower courts, which rejected the lessees'
argument that there is no implie d duty to restore the surface.271

The

lessees sought and obtained supreme court review, but the lessees'
chances of prevailing in the supreme court could not have looked
promising; comments to the Louisiana Mineral Code state that such a
duty exists,

and though such

persuasive authority.272

comments are

not

law,

they have

Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court itself

previously had stated in dicta that such a duty exists.273

Moreover,

coastal erosion is a significant problem in Louisiana, it is widely
accepted that oil and gas activities in the coastal marshes exacerbate the
problem, and there is some degree of public support for requiring oil
and gas

producers to help solve

the problem.

Nevertheless, the

Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that there is
no implied duty to restore the surface and stating that a contrary
holding would impose duties on the lessee which the parties had not
267. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 31, at 658 (predicting in 1 994 the future expansion of
recognition of the implied covenant to restore the surface). So far, though, there has not been any
significant increase in the number of states recognizing this implied covenant. Texas, which long has
rejected any implied duty to restore the surface, has maintained that position. See Fenner v. Samson
Res. Co., No. 01-03-00049, 2005 WL 21 23043, at * 5 (Tex. App. Aug. 3 1 , 2005); see also Exxon Corp.
v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 29-30 (Tex. App. 2002) (rejecting claims that lessee had a duty to remove
equipment and materials) (citing Warren Petroleum v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1957).
Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court has pulled back from prior dicta suggesting that such an
implied duty exists. See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 802 (La.
2005).
268.
269.
270.

893 So. 2d 789 (La. 2005).

Id at 791-92.
Id at 793.

271. Id at 794.
272. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
273. Caskey v. KeUy Oil Co. , 737 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (La. 1999).
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contemplated and for which they had not bargained. 274
But courts are just one branch of government.

Duties expressly

imposed by legislation or regulation might not literally qualify as
"implied covenants," but legislation and r egulation could have some
effect on implied covenants. Why have legislatures and administrative
agencies not done more? Legislatures have enacted some statutes that
affect

directly

development.

or

indirectly

the

implied

covenants

relating

to

Some states have enacted what are effectively statutory

Pugh clauses, which affect the extent t o which a lessee will have to
develop the premises in order to maintain the entire lease. 275 Kansas
has passed the D e ep Horizons Act, which under certain circumstances
creates

a

rebuttable

presumption

that

the implied covenant of
reasonable development has been breached. 276 And of course, there

exists some legislation and regulation relating to liability for o i l spills
and regarding oilfield cleanup, which are relevant · to any implied
covenant to restore the surface.277 One of the reasons there has not
been more legislation and regulation is likely that lawmakers and
regulators are reluctant to alter duties under existing private c o ntracts
to any substantial degree.
The second group that could be a source for change is l essors.
Some have suggested that lessors would become more sophisticated

with time and bargain for more lessor-favorable provisions in leases.27 8
And some lessors do bargain for favorable provisions. In Louisiana, for
example, many leases still are based on standard forms.

But it is not

uncommon for prospective lessors, including persons unsophisticated in
oil and gas matters, to retain counsel and bargain for lessor-favorable
provisions such as standard-Pugh clauses and horizontal-Pugh clauses,27 9
as well as provisions explicitly requiring restoration of the surface to
pre-lease conditions.

Indeed, substantial litigation has been generated

in the last several years by a Louisiana Supreme Court opinion that held
when a lessee contractually obligates itself to restore the surface to pre
lease conditions, it is obligated to do just that, even if the cost of
restoration will exceed the market value of the land in its restored

274.

275.
276.
277.

Terrebonne Parish, 893 So. 2d at 802.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-73-201

(1994).

See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-223 to 55-229 (2008).
See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701 -2762

(2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
(granting Loui siana Department of Natural Resources, Office of Conservation the
.
promulgate regulations for various purposes, including preventing the escape of oil and

30:4(c) ( I ) (2007)
.
authonty to

gas): LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §§ 101-641 (providing regulations that cover, among other things,
proper plugging and abandonment of wells and actions to prevent escape of oil and gas)
.
278. See LOWE, supra note 7, at 352 (noting that some have predicted that "implied covenants
.
will become less important as l�ssors become more sophisticated and demand express covenants") .
279. See, e.g., Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 961 F.2d 1 207, 1208 (5th
Cir. 1992) (involving
.
dispute between lessee and lessors who were natural persons over interpretation of
a horizontal Pugh
clause).
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condition.280 But, the lessors have not driven any wholesale change. As
for why lessors collectively have not done more, there are probably at
least three answers. First, many lessors still are unsophisticated and do
not retain counsel or other expert assistance. Second, for any provision
to be incorporated into a lease, the lessor must not only bargain for it,
but must prevail in convincing the lessee to agree to the provision, and
sometimes that will be difficult.

Third, as for duties relating to

development, it probably is difficult at the beginning of the lease to
define what should be done, and, t herefore, it can be difficult for even a
knowledgeable lessor to know what specific obligations for which he
should bargain to impose on the lessee.
Why have lessors not done more i n the way of filing lawsuits? Why
have they not sought to use new seismic or other exploration technology
to show that lessees have not reasonably developed the leased premises
or asserted that lessees have n o t adequately used new technology 
either

exploration or enhanced

recovery technology?

Lack

of

sophistication amongst lessors is probably one reason. Limited access to
such data and the significant expense of utilizing such technology is
another.

Third, to the extent the lessors will be relying on truly new

technology, a lessee probably has not been unreasonable in failing to
previously use the technology. Finally, the burden of proof can often be
difficult for lessors to carry in cases involving an alleged breach of the
implied covenant of reasonable development.
The third group that could be a source for change is lessees.
Lessees probably are in the best position of the three groups to change
the landscape of implied covenant law. Lessees are in a better position
than government and the courts because lessees are parties to leases
and, thus, can bargain for specific provisions. Also, lessees tend to be
more sophisticated than lessors.

Case law is essentially unanimous in

holding that if a lease expressly addresses a subject, a court should not
find an implied covenant regarding that subj ect.

And, because lessees

are the parties that bear the burden of implied covenants, they have an
incentive t o bargain for lease provisions that eliminate, limit, or at least
specifically define their duties. So, why have lessees not done more?
First, it is noteworthy that lessees have done some things to limit
implied covenants.

One of the implied covenants that has been

recognized since the early days of oil and gas jurisprudence is an implied
covenant t o drill a test well or wells promptly.281

B ut this implied

covenant rarely is an issue anymore because virtually all oil and gas
leases have provisions that expressly address the duty t o drill -either
delay-rental provisions or a provision making the lease a paid-up

280. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 693 (La. 2003).
281. Conine, supra note 58, at 683.
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lease -which, therefore, preclude the existence of an implied covenant
to drilI.282 And occasionally one encounters or reads a case regarding a
lease that expressly defines the extent o f the lessee's duty to drill wells
to develop the leased premises, such as by providing that if the lessee
drills a certain number of wells, the lessee need not drill any more.283
Further, some leases specifically define the circumstances in which the
lessee must drill an offset well.

Yet, most leases do not contain such

provisions. Why not?
Provisions obligating the lessee to drill a minimum number of wells
could disadvantage the lessee if the property turns out to be non
productive. A provision could provide some protection to the lessee by
stating that if the lessee drills a certain number of wells, he n e e d not
(but may) drill more wells. However, such a provision could backfire.
Even if the lease clearly does not require the drilling of a stated number
of wells, a court could view the stated number of wells as evidence of
what the parties thought was a reasonable number of wells.

Further,

such clauses would require the consent of all parties to the lease, and
prospective lessors, particularly more sophisticated lessors, might resist
such provisions.

And, if lessees successfully bargained for provisions

that went beyond limiting the scope of implied covenants, to eliminating
or virtually eliminating all duties to develop, courts might find such
provisions unenforceable as a matter of public policy or might find other
case-specific ways to avoid enforcing such provisions.

Further, it is

difficult at the beginning of a lease to know what will be reasonable
development

of

the

property.

Finally,

there

transactional costs in seeking such provisions.
prospective lessors might become lengthier.

would

be

some

Negotiations with

Also, to the extent the

lessees might attempt to tailor provisions relating to their development
duties to the circumstances of specific proposed leases, much more
analysis and work might be required on the front end of transactions.284
IX. CONCLUSION AND WHAT TO EXPECT IN THE FUTURE
Implied covenants

are

obligations

not

expressly stated

in

a

contract, but which a court will impose on one or both parties. Since the
early days of the oil and gas industry in the late 1800s, courts have
imposed a variety of implied covenants on lessees, including covenants
to drill test wells, to develop reasonably the property after discovery of
oil and gas in paying quantities, and to protect the leased premises
282. Id. at 684.
283. See, e.g. , Lundlin/Weber Co. v. Brea Oil Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768, 773 (Ct. App. 2004).
284. a Conine, supra note 58, at 684 (noting that common use of delay rental provisions arose
because "(leases) are often hastily accomplished in an effort to beat competitors in the acquisition of
drilling rights," frequently prior to conducting geological studies and sometimes before titles are
cleared).
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against drainage of oil and gas by wells on neighboring property.
Authorities disagree on whether these covenants are implied by the
terms of a n oil and gas lease itself and are used by courts to affect the
will of the parties or whether these covenants are implied by law and
used by c ourts to promote fairness and equity.

Both these theories

about the source of implied covenants probably have some merit.
Although there have been significant advances in technology and
shifts i n public policy, implied covenant law has changed remarkably
little over the course of 100 years.

Further, because implied covenant

law tends not to differ dramatically from one state to the next, the shift
in the center of gravity of the oil and gas industry from Pennsylvania in
the early days of the industry to southern and western states has not had
dramatic

effects

on

the

obligations

lessees

bear

under

implied

covenants. Moreover, although some commentators have predicted that
implied covenant law would become less significant as parties became
more sophisticated and bargained for lease terms that expressly define a
lessee's specific duties, this generally has not happened and implied
covenant law remains highly relevant as part of oil and gas law.
It is tempting to predict that advances in technology, changes in
public policy to favor increased

production and

tighter pollution

controls, and a hypothesized increase in sophistication of both lessors
and lessees will lead to significant changes in implied covenant law in
upcoming years as well as the decreased significance of such covenants.
But the lesson of history suggests that the law of implied covenants
instead will change relatively little and will remain highly significant in
the coming years.
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